Strategic Failure

Back in one piece - amazing how fast the news cycle now turns, that news such as the Carolyn Parrish affair seems so painfully out-of-date already. For the record, I think she should have been booted long ago and only Martin's now characteristic hesitancy kept her around. Difficult to imagine a better example of rank ineptitude and blatant idiocy from a Member of Parliament. On to the new, I suppose. But first I wanted to post one final thought on the twin failures of the Kerry candidacy (stop kicking the dead brahmin already -ed.) that Cooper discussed below, namely the statement that: "...it came down to two things: Kerry's incessant negativity and his inability to articulate and drive home a different strategy for fighting terrorism." The "incessant" negativity complaint, while accurate, is a difficult one to pin on Kerry and his people. The fact is that Bush's faith-based, fairytale worldview and his "mistake-free" Presidency necessitated a campaign based primarily on rebutting dramatic distortions. It was shocking the delusion they got away with... Maybe it went overboard, as Tim states, but surely this is only a matter of degree. A referendum on the incumbent by definition involves putting out the negative spin as well as possible, so I have no complaints - and certainly not a litany of them - on this front. After all, Kerry was refreshingly optimistic on jobs and the economy. So did it really just come down to point #2 - Terrorism, stupid? Well, Yes. The question, at least for the short-term, is no longer Reagan's "Are you better off than you were four years ago?" That emphasizes negativity and it is retrospective. The new question Kerry probably needed to answer: "Do you feel that four more years of this administration will really make you safer?" I know this could be construed as playing on the other guy's turf, but that doesn't necessarily mean the home team always wins. The failure to reassure voters on the terrorism front was critical, and without this Rove's "experiment" would have certainly failed. Cooper has done an admirable job of dissecting the abysmal ability of Kerry camp to satisfy voters that the country would be safer following a Bush loss, but note that this often cut across party lines. Think Christopher Hutchins, Think Dick Morris, Think Glenn Reynolds - prime examples of independants who favored the President (however slightly) due to the tough stance on terror. The reason the incumbency rule probably didn't matter this time around was the increased scrutiny on the challenger that "wartime" demands. The stealth candidacy of Kerry - and of future Democrats - would only be successful if he could ALSO prove that HE could be trusted. And what were his credentials? I fought in Vietnam. Not enough, absent a cohesive strategy that never materialized. Too bad people weren't more afraid of the Yakutza. Why didn't Kerry develop that strategy? Maybe we can blame his advisors. Or maybe the main problem was that no Democrat running for President did, nor did any have foreign security credentials [except Gen. Clark, but see below]. In the most foolish analogy of the campaign, people tried to say that since Bush didn't have any experience pre-2000, then he could be challenged. Uh, no, that Bush is not running for President this time. Edwards? a few years on a Senate Intelligence Committee he frequently missed. Dean? governor of a small New England State. Gephardt? too closely tied to the President's foray into Iraq and the status quo. Lieberman? his plan was no different than Bush's! So Kerry wins by default by invoking Vietnam. Then, since the strategy worked a miracle for him once, he tries it again. Instead of using it as a shield to protect against attacks, he gets starts bragging about his tours of duty as if he was a lone soldier. And not only is his new opponent better financed and prepared, he has the advantage of already of leading the country in two wars... so Kerry never quite gets over the hump on the security issue, and his advantages on the whole host of other issues aren't quite enough. End of my analysis of election 2004. [NOTE: What about General Clark, you might ask above. Maybe Moore was right to endorse him in the primary for the reasons above. However, I simply think Clark proved that it is almost impossible to run for Presidency without any prior experience in elected politics. He couldn't speak on the stump and would never have held up over such a long, grueling campaign. Incidentally, this is one of the (many) reasons I convulse into laughter whenever I stumble across rumours of a Condoleeza Rice 2008 run. I look forward to Cooper's 2008 potential candidates, but I really don't think Rice has any hope whatsoever.]